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Abstract: Theoretically, cross ownership may mitigate mergers, i.e. market concentrations. 
Holding a share in a competing firm before the acquisition of another firm, outsider-toehold, 
is more profitable in some market constellations, due to the positive externality on the 
outsider (competing) firm when a merger occurs. The purposes of this paper are to 
empirically observe when US firms buy outsider-toeholds and through event-studies estimate 
the gains of buyers, outsider firms and competitors when firms holding outsider-toeholds 
merge. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Back in 1985, on September 3, the firm Petrie Stores bought a 25-percent share in Paul 
Harris Stores, a competitor in women’s clothing in the US. On May 13 in the following year, 
Petrie Stores publicly announced a bid for a takeover of Lerner Stores, another firm in the 
industry. This announcement caused a 30 percent (abnormal) increase in the stock price of 
Paul Harris Stores, a firm not directly involved in the Petrie Stores – Lerner Stores deal. Why 
did the value of Paul Harris Stores increase? It may be due to a market concentration, 
increasing the producer surplus or increased expectations of becoming a target in a future 
Petrie Stores acquisition. Nevertheless, the value of the $80 million firm Paul Harris Stores 
increased by $24 million (30 percent) from the acquisition announcement and a quarter of 
that increase, $6 million, benefited Petrie Stores. The 25 percent ownership may thus have 
been bought for strategic reasons in mitigating the spring acquisition of Lerner Stores, an 
acquisition that would otherwise not have been motivated. 
In the economics literature, there exists an important obstacle to anti-competitive 
mergers, demonstrating that competing firms outside the merger may benefit more than the 
buyer and the target firm, since they gain from an increase in price but need not reduce their 
own output. Stigler (1950) first spelled this out, mentioning a potential coordination problem 
for firms since it is preferable to stay outside the merger and wait for other firms within the 
industry to merge. More recently, in a simultaneous acquisition game, Kamien and Zang 
(1993) prove the existence of a no-merger equilibrium even though a merger is profitable, i.e. 
the total producer surplus increases when a merger occurs. Fridolfsson and Stennek (2004) 
also supports a no-merger equilibrium in a setup consistent with simple Bertrand and Cournot 
models. This puzzle is referred to as the insiders’ dilemma. 
As the first paragraph may hint, there can be a solution to this puzzle. Lindqvist (2004) 
proves that for some specifications, the insiders’ dilemma can be eliminated and all profitable  
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mergers occur in equilibrium. For this to be possible, an acquirer buys a portion of a rival 
firm before the acquisition of another rival firm. However, this is only necessary when the 
dilemma is prominent. The share held by an acquirer in a rival firm (25 percent in the initial 
example) is called an outsider-toehold. 
Cross ownership among firms is common and may have many reasons. However, this 
paper focuses on cross ownership, i.e. outsider-toeholds, within the own industry. Firms buy 
a share of a rival firm to extract positive externalities from a market concentration. Table 1 
presents all outsider-toeholds bought during the years 1985 to 2000 among 330 000 
worldwide observations included in the Thomson Financial mergers and acquisitions 
database.  
TABLE 1: Outsider-toeholds within the same industry 
  U.S.A.  World (incl. U.S.A.) 
2-SIC (83 industries)  1,429 (20 %)  10,217 (30 %) 
4-SIC (1021 industries)  783 (11 %)  6,617 (19 %) 
Total  7,289 34,254 
 
Conditional on buying a share of another firm, 30 percent of these purchases occur 
within the same industry including observations from all over the world. Industries are 
defined as firms having the same 2-digit sic code. Firms are thus clustered in 83 different 
industries and assuming them all to be of equal size and randomly choosing target firms in 
which to buy outsider-toeholds, firms within the same industry would, on average, be targets 
slightly above one percent (1/83) of the time. A random choice of where to buy an outsider-
toehold can definitely be rejected, also on the US data with 20 percent buying shares in firms 
within the same industry. Narrowing the definition of industries to a 4-digit sic code (with 
1021 industries) makes the result even more obvious with 19 and 11 percent of the outsider-
toeholds being bought within the industry for firms all over the world and US firms, 
respectively.  
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Firms holding shares in other firms are not an exceptional feature. The reasons for these 
cross ownerships may e.g. be investment strategies for diversifying risk or acquisition 
strategies such as the outsider-toehold theory in this paper or the toehold theory, where a 
share of the target firm is bought before an acquisition. The investment reason may be 
motivated, since information about the own industry is superior. In contrast diversifying risk 
would imply investments in other industries. Acquisition strategies may thus be stronger 
reasons for explaining the vast investment results within the same industry in Table 1. 
The main purposes of this paper is to demonstrate the existence of outsider-toeholds, 
test if acquirers benefit from holding outsider-toeholds and estimate gains for merging parties 
with and without outsider-toeholds. Looking at US mergers and acquisitions in 1985 to 2000, 
event studies are used to estimate premiums from stock market reactions and regressions to 
search for possible variables explaining these premiums. 
In Section 2, a short model description demonstrates the acquisition strategy, section 3 
the testing procedures, section 4 spells out the results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. MODEL 
Consider an industry with three firms; one buyer (firm a) and two sellers (firms b and 
c). An acquisition game of two periods precedes the one period market game, where each 
firm initially gets a triopoly profit, π(3) and if two firms merge, they each get a duopoly 
profit, π(2). Only one merger can take place and a merger to duopoly is assumed to be 
profitable, i.e. 2π(2) > 3π(3). 
If firm a offers a bid to a seller, it must be at least the size of a triopoly profit for a 
seller to accept in equilibrium. A buyer would only make such an offer if this implies a 
higher profit than the initial triopoly profit, i.e. π(2)- π(3) > π(3). This inequality is stronger  
  5
than the assumption of profitable mergers to a duopoly and some of the profitable mergers 
may thus not occur. 
Now, consider the acquisition strategy in Figure 1. Before the acquisition takes place, 
the acquirer buys an outsider-toehold, p, in firm c. 
 
FIGURE 1: Acquisition Strategy 
For this strategy to be profitable for firm a, the following must hold: 
 
π(2) + pπ(2) - π(3) - pπ(3) > π(3).     Eq.  1 
 
In the market, firm a profits from a duopoly profit, π(2), from its own firm and its 
holding share in the rival firm. A triopoly profit, π(3), is paid in the second period of the 
acquisition game when firm b is acquired and a portion, p, of a triopoly profit when the 
outsider-toehold is bought from firm c. Rewriting Equation 1, we get (π(2) - π(3))*(1 + p) > 
π(3), which demonstrates that there always exists a pЄ[0,1] where this and the profitability 
inequality hold. Hence, all profitable mergers can occur in equilibrium. 
Lindqvist (2004) presents a more extensive three-period model, cf. the above example 
with only two periods. To facilitate empirical tests, only two periods are used in this study. In 
both cases, however, the results are driven by the positive externality on the outsider firm, the 
existence of which is the main focus of this empirical paper. 
Theoretically, the size of an outsider-toehold is somewhere between zero and 100 
percent. However, it is necessary for a buyer not to acquire a firm in the first period, but only  
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buy a share of this firm. In reality, outsider-toeholds cannot be too large for an acquisition to 
take place and in Figure 1, the outsider-toehold is illustrated as a share less than 50 percent, 
which is also a necessary constraint in the empirical analysis. Although the definition of an 
acquisition is more complex than this simple majority rule, there may be good reasons for 
excluding shares larger than 50 percent, since majority ownership can have similar 
characteristics as an acquisition in terms of e.g. production quantities, prices and takeover 
decisions. In fact, holding more than 50 percent of the stock value is often not enough for 
taking control of a company. In the US, the so-called supermajority is applicable in many 
antitakeover amendments, stating that a change in control requires shareholder approval by at 
least a two-third vote and sometimes as much as 90 percent of the voting power. Also when 
countries have different voting power for different stocks, such as e.g. France and Sweden, it 
is possible to hold more than 50 percent of the firm value, but less than half the votes. In 
contrast, holding less than half of the value of a company may be considered as an acquisition 
if the strong voting power shares are acquired. Also in countries without different voting 
power shares, holding a minority of the shares may be sufficient for an acquisition if the 
remaining ownership structure is dispersed.1 In the empirical analysis an outsider-toehold is 
defined as buying less than 50 percent of the stocks, holding less than 50 percent afterwards 
and not being defined as an acquisition in the database. An acquisition is defined as holding 
less than 50 percent before the deal, more than 50 percent after the deal and being defined as 
an acquisition in the database. 
 
 
                                                 
1 According to European Commission IV/M.025 - Arjomari/Wiggins Teape of February 10, 1990, an 
acquisition takes place if a majority of the voting rights are held. A minority of the voting rights may also be 
treated as an acquisition if these votes obtain a majority at the shareholders' meeting, due to the remaining votes 
being spread out among many small shareholders.  
  7
3. TESTING PROCEDURES 
3.1 Merger Premiums with Event Studies 
To evaluate acquisition strategies, stock market reactions are used as approximations 
for gains from involving firms and estimations of premiums are calculated using event 
studies. Using stock market data has potential problems. In general, to find positive or 
negative reactions from the stock market in event studies, the events must be unexpected. 
Even if the particular event is unexpected, problems may arise in interpreting the data since 
investors may have other expectations that can affect stock prices in one direction or the 
other. Furthermore, the event itself may be endogenous and signaling something else than 
what should be tested.2 
There are several advantages in using stock market data when studying mergers and 
acquisitions, such as stock market reactions also being available for blocked mergers, it is 
relatively easy to obtain data, evaluations are relatively independent from insiders and all 
long- and short-term aspects can be captured in the reactions. Despite potential problems, 
event studies do not seem to have any clear superior methods for evaluating events such as 
mergers and acquisitions, M&As. 
The market model is used to estimate abnormal returns from acquisitions. For any 
security i, the market model is 
 
it mt i i it R R ε β α + + =      Eq.  2 
 
where  it R  and  mt R  are the period-t returns on security i and the market portfolio, 
respectively, and  it ε  is the zero mean disturbance term. S&P 500 Index is used as returns  
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from the market portfolio and 250 observations (trading days) to estimate parameters for each 
security i. Observations are based on daily closing stock prices adjusted for dividends and 
splits on the trading day -270 to -21, relative to the event day, i.e. day zero. 
To calculate abnormal returns, an event day and an event window need to be 
established. In this study, two different events will be evaluated for each security, using the 
same estimated parameters from Equation 2. The first event day is when the purchase of an 
outsider-toehold is announced and the second the day of announcement of an acquisition. The 
assumption of ineffective markets implies including some days before and after the event day 
to capture possible market reactions due to e.g. insider trading before and delayed reactions 
after the announcement. These days (including the event day) are called the event window. 
The length of this window is not definite; some figures commonly used are 1, 3, 11, 21 and 
41 days. What kind of event is evaluated but also efficiency in the market, e.g. availability of 
information, are, of course, crucial. On the one hand, a long window is preferred since the 
probability of capturing the entire effect then increases, but on the other hand, a short 
window is advocated to avoid other effects, not related to the evaluating event. 
There are two strong reasons for using at least one day before and after the event day 
(three-day window). First, we have the “newspaper effect” which arises when announcement 
days are defined as when first appearing in the financial press. Since news usually has a one 
day delay in newspapers, the day before the event day should be included. The second is the 
“closing time effect” due to the closing times on stock markets. Announcements of events 
after the stock exchange market has closed affect stock prices at the opening time the 
subsequent day in an efficient market. In the US, this effect may be more prominent due to 
different time zones. The main reason for including more than one day after the event is slow 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 See Duso et al (2003) for an extensive discussion on problems concerning event studies for merger 
evaluations.  
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market reactions caused by e.g. weak information channels or liquidity constraints. Including 
more than one day before the event day is rather related to insider trading, i.e. some investors 
are trading on non public information. At the end of the last millennium in the computer age, 
information channels are likely to be strong and investors (such as large investment banks) 
liquid, which would favor few days of inclusion after the event. In contrast, non public 
information may be more difficult to conceal and larger trading volumes with larger 
possibilities for substantial gains may make it more tempting to trade on inside information. 
This supports more than one day before the event within the window. In fact, most event 
studies concerning M&As in the last twenty years have shown a pattern supporting these 
arguments.3 Some days (five to ten) before the event, the stock price starts reacting but 
reactions more than one day after the event are rare. My belief before running any empirical 
tests is to include day +1 to -1 or some days before (here +5) to -1 in the event window. 
These two windows will be more important in the main conclusions, but other intervals will 
also be examined. Using the market model to measure the normal return, the sample 
abnormal return,  iT AR , is 
mT i i iT iT R R AR
∧ ∧
− − = β α      Eq.  3 
where T is each day in the event window. For each day, the average abnormal returns,  T AR , 
of all securities are estimated and summed up over the event window, thereby forming the 
cumulative average abnormal return, CAAR. Standard errors from Equation 2 will be used to 
estimate variances in the hypothesis testing of the CAAR.4 When testing for differences 
                                                 
3 See e.g. Bradley et al (1988) or Betton and Eckbo (2000). 
4 Autocorrelation does not seem to be a general problem for individual regressions. The Durbin-Watson test 
could not reject the null hypothesis at the 1 percent significance level of no positive autocorrelation against the 
alternative hypothesis of positive autocorrelation in any of the 186 regressions. However, negative 
autocorrelation was found in about 10 percent (18/186) of the regressions. Since regression results are 
aggregated, thereby diminishing the influence of individual estimations, there have been no adjustments in 
variances.  
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between two CAARs, the two standard deviations from these samples are used for calculating 
t-values.5 
3.2 Data description and hypothesis testing 
M&As are collected from the Thomson Financial database and firm-specific data from 
Compustat. Only US firms are considered during the years 1985 to 2000. As illustrated by the 
acquisition strategy in Figure 1, two different observations are necessary for firms to be 
included. In the first period, an outsider-toehold is acquired, defined as buying a share less 
than 50 percent and holding less than 50 percent in the target firm afterwards, not being an 
acquisition. In the second stage, an acquisition takes place, which is defined as holding less 
than 50 percent before and more than 50 percent after the deal, being an acquisition. Hence, 
three types of firms are involved; buyer, B, and outsider-toehold firm, O-T, in period 1 and 
buyer and seller, S, in period 2. All firms must belong to the same line of business, i.e. being 
rivals, which is defined as the same 4-digit sic code at the time of the announcement for 
buying an outsider-toehold (firms can change sic codes). Furthermore, all firms not directly 
involved in this strategy but having the same sic code in that year will also be examined, 
referred to as competitors, C. Four different types of firms are thus considered at two 
different events. To ensure as clean observations as possible, all three firms directly involved 
in the two-period-strategy must not be part of any other deal with any other firm before the 
announcement of the acquisition in period 2. This (as will be seen in the result section) 
disqualifies a vast majority of the observations in the Thomson database. 
Hypotheses will be formed to test the theoretical results from Lindqvist (2004), briefly 
discussed in section 2. In the first period, the outsider-toehold firm may increase or may not 
be different from zero. If expectations about the later market concentration are considerably 
higher after this event, there will be an increase in value since outsider-toehold firms will 
                                                 
5 For a detail description of event studies and statistical interpretation, see e.g. MacKinlay (1997).  
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gain from this. In contrast, if there is no change in expectations, the value will be unaffected 
and only increase in the second period, when the acquisition occurs. 
Although expectations of later acquisitions may be diffuse and not as clear as in the 
theoretical case, the empirical literature points at other reasons for an increase in value. In 
M&As, targets receive a large bid premium (20-40 percent) whereas buyers are not affected.6 
Hence, an outsider-toehold can be treated as a “partial” acquisition with a proportionate 
bidding premium. Furthermore, the share bought may be treated as a toehold by the stock 
market, as in the finance literature, i.e. a share of a target firm is bought before the 
acquisition. Grossman and Hart (1980) and Bagnoli and Lipman (1988) prove that this can be 
profitable for the acquirer and the outsider-toehold firm may thus be expected to become a 
target at a later stage.7 Although expecting an increase in outsider-toehold firms, the 
alternative hypothesis is set as no differences rather than being larger than zero since the 
theoretical predictions are ambiguous. A two-sided test also requires larger t-values for 
significant differences and is more neutral, making the test “stronger” in this perspective. 
Target premium hypothesis: 
  0 : 0 = −T O CAAR H  
0 : ≠ −T O a CAAR H . 
Abnormal returns for buyers and competitors are assumed not to be different from zero 
when the outsider-toehold is bought, i.e. the expectations for a future acquisition have not 
changed. 
                                                 
6 See e.g. Franks and Harris (1989) and Bradley et al (1988). 
7 Buying toeholds is not rare. In the sample of Bradley et al (1988), 34 percent of the buyers held a toehold in 
the target when an acquisition was announced. Jennings and Mazzeo (1993) and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) find 
toeholds in more than 50 percent of the acquisitions, the former also find most of them to be small (on average 3 
percent). In Betton and Eckbo (2000), more than half the buyers held toeholds and the target premium was 
decreasing in the size of the toehold. Franks and Harris (1989) did not find any differences in target premiums 
with and without toeholds.  
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In the second stage, when the acquisition takes place, the outsider-toehold firm is 
expected to have a positive abnormal return, unconditional on the effect in the first period. A 
buyer is assumed to extract gains from the outsider-toehold to mitigate the acquisition. This 
is crucial, since this is what the theoretical assumption leans on. Also in this hypothesis is a 
two-sided test applicable. 
Outsider-toehold externality hypothesis: 
 0 : 0 = −T O CAAR H  
0 : ≠ −T O a CAAR H . 
Also in this second stage is the assumption of no effects on buyers consistent with 
theory. The effect on competitors is ambiguous. If markets are concentrated, a positive 
reaction is expected but otherwise, no effects are assumed. 
The next hypothesis will test if buyers are randomly choosing outsider-toehold firms 
within the same industry or if these firms have different CAARs as compared to their 
competitors. This test also concerns the second stage. 
Outsider-toehold vs. competitor firm hypothesis: 
  C T O CAAR CAAR H = − : 0  
C T O a CAAR CAAR H ≠ − :.  
For the buyer, however, one more test may be necessary to further support the 
theoretical results. Consider no effects in the value of buyers in the two periods, but an 
increase in the outsider-toehold firm in the second stage. This implies that despite the 
external gains extracted from holding shares in a rival firm, the total value of the buyer 
remains unchanged. One explanation to this may be an endogenous choice of whether to buy 
an outsider-toehold. Firms may only use the outsider-toehold acquisition strategy when 
mergers are difficult and costly, i.e. when the insiders’ dilemma is prominent. Lindqvist  
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(2004) proves that this may be valid; when the insiders’ dilemma does not exist, buyers do 
not benefit from buying outsider-toeholds. Hence, one may expect not to observe any 
differences in the abnormal return from a buyer holding an outsider-toehold, as compared to 
one not holding any. For this to be tested, we need to extend the sample and include pure 
acquisitions, i.e. involving firms that do not hold any shares in other firms, and make a 
comparison with the buyers included in the tests above. 
A buyer not holding any outsider-toehold is referred to as a buyer of type 2, B2, and its 
opponent a seller of type 2, S2. These acquisitions are similar to those with outsider-toeholds 
in all respects but the outsider-toehold existence. Hence, these firms have the same 4-digit sic 
code and both firms lack in transactions of shares with other firms. In that sense, it can be 
treated as a clean acquisition. 
Comparing buyers using the outsider-toehold strategy with buyers who do not, may 
indicate if strategies are exogenously chosen. 
Buyer profitability hypothesis: 
  2 0 : B B CAAR CAAR H =  
2 : B B a CAAR CAAR H ≠ . 
3.3 Regressions 
The desired effect of buying an outsider-toehold may depend on many variables not 
considered in the above hypothesis testing. To examine possible explanatory factors 
determining the CAARs for outsider-toehold firms, O-T, in the second stage when an 
acquisition announcement occurs, the regression in Equation 4 is run 
i i i i T O u S C T CAAR + + + + = − 3 2 1 0 β β β β .   Eq.  4 
Variable  T is the time in years between the announcement of buying an outsider-
toehold and the announcement of the acquisition. When these two events are close in time,  
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the externality of buying an outsider-toehold may be more profitable, since it may be easier 
to identify a firm generating a gain closer in time. 
A concentrated market with few firms may imply larger profits for the remaining firms 
after a merger, since in e.g. a simple linear Cournot model, the single firm profit is decreasing 
and convex in the number of firms within the industry. Variable C is the number of 
competitors (def. as equal 4-digit sic code) in the database, used as an approximation of the 
number of firms within the industry for testing for decreasing profits. Variable S is the size of 
the outsider-toehold. 
Note that the model in Lindqvist (2004) is consistent with  0 β >0,  2 β <0 and  3 β =0. 
Parameter  1 β  does not affect the profits of a buyer in the model and is thus not expected to 
differ from zero. However, for simplicity, no discounting factor is used in the theoretical 
model (sec. 2 and Lindqvist (2004)) but introducing one would predict a negative sign on  1 β . 
A second regression is executed to test for possible differences between CAARs for 
buyers holding an outsider-toehold versus buyers who do not, i.e. B vs. B2. For buyers with 
outsider-toeholds (B), the CAARs from both periods are aggregated to compare with buyers 
only realizing an acquisition (B2). Independent variables are given in Equation 5 
i i i i Buyer u F M A CAAR + + + + = 3 2 1 0 α α α α . Eq.  5 
All variables are dummies, where A is one if an acquisition takes place after the 
announcement, and zero otherwise. Note that CAARs are estimated at the time of the 
announcement and an acquisition does not necessarily occur at a later stage. M equals one if 
the offer is made in a multiple bidder contest, and zero otherwise. Including the number of 
bidding firms instead of this dummy variable may be motivated but since most bidding 
contests only have two firms involved in this sample, this was not considered. F will be used 
to compare CAARs for different firm types and is one when a buyer holds an outsider- 
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toehold (B), and zero otherwise (B2). All parameters are expected not to differ from zero, i.e. 
0 α = 1 α = 2 α = 3 α =0. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Outsider-toehold results 
The acquisition strategy in Figure 1 may look simple. Finding observations for 
empirical testing of this strategy is demanding, however, due to the two-stage game. Events 
such as other shares being bought or sold by any involved firm before or between the stages 
create noise and have thus been excluded. Hence, only pure observations are considered in 
the empirical tests. 
All acquisitions (and sometimes mergers) studied are presented in the Appendix, Table 
A1. The sample includes 18 buyers (B), 36 outsider-toehold firms (O-T), 97 competitors (C) 
and 35 buyers without outsider-toeholds (B2). Sellers are specified for some observations in 
Table A1, although not included in the statistical testing. 
In Table 1, CAARs for buyers, outsider-toehold firms and competitors are presented. 
Six different event windows have been used for each firm type but the focus, motivated in 
section 3.1, for the conclusions will be on -5 to +1 and -1 to +1 (bold figures in all tables) and 
the remaining windows are more like robustness tests. CAARs from Table 1 are plotted in 
Figure 2. 
TABLE 2: CAARs at the announcement of outsider-toehold 
Buyers, B  Outsider-toehold firms, O-T Competitors, C  Event 
window  CAAR t-value  CAAR  t-value  CAAR t-value 
-20 to +20  -0.008  0.185  0.279**  2.281  0.016  0.740 
-10 to +10  0.010  0.326  0.182**  2.080  -0.001  0.069 
-5 to +5  0.013  0.580  0.146**  2.308     0.024**  2.188 
-5 to +1  0.024  1.313  0.164**  3.241  0.011  1.323 
-1 to +1  0.011  0.894  0.138**  4.165  0.009  1.508 
Event day  -0.005  0.663  0.011  0.558  0.002  0.516 
  * Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level.  
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Firms where an outsider-toehold is bought have a significantly (95 percent level) 
positive response in the stock price, as indicated by Figure 2. Note that all ranges of the event 
window but the actual event day have a definite increasing CAAR. This can exemplify 
misinterpretations when not including more days around the single event day. 































As illustrated by Figure 2, buyers and competitors are generally not affected by this 
event, although competitors show a significantly increasing CAAR for the -5 to +5 event 
window. However, these returns can not compare to the nearly 30 percent CAAR from 
outsider-toehold firms over the -20 to +20 window. Furthermore, the pattern of this CAAR is 
similar to reactions to target firm stock prices upon the announcement of an acquisition, i.e. 
without outsider-toeholds. Some days before the announcement, the stock price is increasing 
and a sudden shift occurs just before the event day, followed by no trend. The null hypothesis 
of CAARs being equal to zero for outsider-toehold firms is rejected. 
Target premium hypothesis result: Stock prices increase heavily for firms where an 
outsider-toehold is bought. 
4.2 Acquisition results  
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Table 3 presents the results for the second stage, at the announcement of the 
acquisition. 
TABLE 3: CAARs at the announcement of an acquisition with outsider-toeholds 
Buyers, B  Outsider-toehold firms, O-T Competitors, C  Event 
window  CAAR t-value  CAAR  t-value  CAAR t-value 
-20 to +20  -0.114**  2.549  -0.006  0.062  -0.083**  4.293 
-10 to +10  -0.058  1.606  0.020*  1.667  -0.013  0.917 
-5 to +5  -0.033  1.430  0.017  0.313  -0.003  0.303 
-5 to +1  -0.020  1.086  0.040*  1.837  -0.022  1.618 
-1 to +1  -0.027  1.193  0.042**  2.524  -0.013  1.479 
Event day  -0.018  1.624  0.027*  1.698  -0.005  1.613 
  * Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level. 
Stock price reactions for buying and competing firms tend to decrease, but only the -20 
to +20 event window differs significantly from zero. In contrast, outsider-toehold firms 
experience a CAAR significantly different from zero. On average, about a four-percent 
increase due to the acquisition announcement is found a few days around the event. This 
result indicates that firms holding outsider-toeholds extract external gains when realizing an 
acquisition and the null hypothesis of CAARs equaling zero is thus rejected. 
Outsider-toehold externality hypothesis:  Buyers extract gains from holding an 
outsider-toehold when announcing an acquisition. 
The theory states that outsider-toeholds are bought in rival firms. However, many rivals 
with various reactions to stock prices may exist. Further analysis is necessary to examine 
whether firms tend to invest shares in rivals experiencing positive and relatively superior 
stock price reactions. Table 4 presents CAARs for buyers not holding any outsider-toehold, 
B2, in the second column and differences between CAARs for outsider-toehold firms and 
competitors in the fourth column and finally, in the sixth column, CAAR differences between 
buyers with and without outsider-toeholds, B-B2. Note that CAARs for buyers, B, are 
presented in Table 3. The two differences are also plotted in Figure 3. 
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TABLE 4: Differences in CAARs at the announcement of an acquisition 
Buyers, B2  O-T - C  B - B2  Event 
window  CAAR t-value  CAAR  t-value  CAAR t-value 
-20 to +20  -0.020  0.332  0.076  0.730  -0.094  1.242 
-10 to +10  -0.010  0.239  0.032  0.432  -0.068  1.263 
-5 to +5  -0.010  0.326  0.020  0.364  -0.023  0.585 
-5 to +1  -0.013  0.498  0.061*  1.722  -0.008  0.242 
-1 to +1  -0.018  1.069  0.055**  1.965  -0.009  0.437 
Event day  -0.022**  2.307  0.032**  1.977  0.004  0.305 
  * Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level. 
 

























































CAAR differences between outsider-toehold firms and competitors are positive and 
significantly different from zero a few days around the event day, i.e. -5 to +1, -1 to +1 and 
the event day. The null hypothesis of no differences is thus rejected. Furthermore, the stock 
price increases for outsider-toehold firms in 26 of the 36 firms studied (72 percent). 
Outsider-toehold vs. competitor firm hypothesis:  Buyers tend to invest outsider-
toeholds in firms with a positive and, relative to its rivals, superior CAAR. 
According to the result so far, buyers extract gains from buying an outsider-toehold 
before making an acquisition. Hence, if the choice of holding an outsider-toehold is  
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exogenous, these buyers should experience a larger CAAR as compared to buyers not 
holding outsider-toeholds. But if the choice of buying an outsider-toehold is endogenous, we 
may not observe differences in CAARs. In fact, Lindqvist (2004) suggests that only when the 
insiders’ dilemma is prominent is it necessary for buyers to hold outsider-toeholds for an 
acquisition to occur in equilibrium. Hence, buyers neither gain nor lose from the acquisition 
when holding outsider-toeholds, since this strategy is only used when mergers are difficult. 
CAARs in the sixth column of Table 4 do not differ from zero and thus, the null 
hypothesis of equal CAARs for buyers with and without outsider-toeholds cannot be rejected. 
This indicates an endogenous choice of whether to buy an outsider-toehold. Furthermore, 
even though these differences are not significantly different from zero, they are mostly 
negative, thereby supporting the theory of only using outsider-toeholds when mergers are 
difficult. 
Buyer profitability hypothesis: CAARs are not significantly different from zero at the 
announcement of an acquisition for buyers with and without outsider-toeholds. 
4.3 Regression results 
The results in the previous section indicate a positive reaction to the stock price of 
outsider-toehold firms at the acquisition announcement. To search for variables explaining 
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a  Ordinary least square estimators for 36 firms on  i i i i T O u S C T CAAR + + + + = − 3 2 1 0 β β β β  at the 
announcement date of acquisition, where  i T  is the time in years between outsider-toehold and acquisition 
announcements,  i C  the number of competitors and  i S  the size of the outsider-toehold. The length of the event 
window determines the CAARs (cumulative average abnormal returns) for each of the six dependent variables 
used. One-sided tests are used for testing  0 β >0,  1 β <0 and  2 β <0 and two-sided tests for testing 
0 ≠ − statistic F  and  0 3 ≠ β  against the null hypotheses of not being different from zero (t-statistics in 
parentheses). White’s test did not detect heteroskedasticity (highest  907 . 10
2 = w nR ~
2
9 χ  for  1 / 5 + − CAAR ). 
Mutual correlations between variables are not significantly different from zero (highest |corr(T, C) |=0.338). 
  * Significant at the 90 percent level. 
** Significant at the 95 percent level. 
Different dependent variables, i.e. varying lengths of the event window, are used as a 
robustness test for establishing relations between variables. Bold results are somewhat more 
important (see the discussion in section 3.1) for general conclusions. 
The constant  0 β  is positive in all regressions, but the null hypothesis of this constant 
equaling zero is only rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of a positive constant for 
some of the regressions. Altogether, when controlling for the variables in Equation 4, the 
results weakly support a positive reaction on the stock price of the outsider-toehold firm, 
which is consistent with theory and the hypothesis testing result in section 4.2.  
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Column three in Table 5 indicates a negative relation between the time between buying 
an outsider-toehold and making an acquisition, T, and the CAAR. The null hypothesis of 
parameter  1 β  equaling zero is rejected in some regressions in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis of a negative relation. This weakly supports the hypothesis that when firms use 
the outsider-toehold acquisition strategy, the time between the two events is short, whereas 
when much time has passed, this strategy is less pronounced. 
The number of competitors, C, does not seem to affect the CAAR. A null hypothesis of 
2 β  being equal to zero cannot be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of a negative 
parameter. This contradicts theory, but the definition of a competitor in this study may not be 
appropriate or more observations may be needed to establish stronger results. Also for the 
last parameter,  3 β , the null hypothesis of equaling zero cannot be rejected in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis of not being equal to zero. Hence, the share of the outsider-toehold 
does not seem to determine CAARs, which is consistent with theory. 
Results on CAARs for outsider-toehold firms at the acquisition announcement: 
Stock prices tend to increase in general but are decreasing in the time between outsider-
toehold and acquisition announcements. 















0 α  
 
1 α  
 
2 α  
 




2 R  




























































a  Ordinary least square estimators for 53 firms on  i i i i Buyer u F M A CAAR + + + + = 3 2 1 0 α α α α  at  the 
announcement date of the acquisition (for buyers with outsider-toeholds, the CAAR from this announcement is 
also included), where  i A  is a dummy variable equaling one if an acquisition occurs and zero otherwise,  i M  a 
dummy equaling one if the offer is made in a multiple bidder contest and zero otherwise and  i F  a dummy 
equaling one if the buyer holds an outsider-toehold and zero otherwise. The length of the event window 
determines the CAARs for each of the six dependent variables used (t-statistics in parentheses). White’s test did 
not detect heteroskedasticity (highest  798 . 3
2 = w nR ~
2
4 χ  for  EventDay CAAR ). Mutual correlations between 
variables are not significantly different from zero (highest |corr(M, F) |=0.326). 
  * Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level.  
The null hypothesis of a parameter equal to zero against the alternative hypothesis of 
not equaling zero is used for all parameters in Table 6. In fact, the null cannot be rejected for 
any parameter except  0 α  and  1 α  when using CAARs from the event day as the dependent 
variable. However, the event day is not sufficient for drawing conclusions and since the other 
regression results are insignificant and also have different signs, no general relations can be 
established. 
Variable F is a dummy variable used to test whether buyers with outsider-toeholds, 
F=1, experience a larger positive reaction to the stock price than buyers without a share in 
another firm in the industry. However, this is not supported in the regression results from 
Equation 5 in Table 6, which are consistent with the conclusions from section 4.2. Note that  
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the definition of the CAAR is different in this section, since CAARs from both the outsider-
toehold and the acquisition announcements are aggregated. 
Acquisitions occurring after the announcement, A=1, and offers made in a multiple 
bidding contest, M=1, do not significantly affect the CAAR. 
Results on CAARs for buyers at the announcement of acquisition: CAARs are not 
different for buyers with and without outsider-toeholds. 
In general, the observations used in this section are not as many as desired. Excluding 
outliers may be one way of increasing the significance, particularly when having few 
observations. However, no outliers significantly increasing the t-statistics were found. Low 
2 R s (particularly in Table 6) and insignificant estimated parameters indicate that the results 
are somewhat weak and should not be considered to be too generalized and established 
without further testing on additional data. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the economics literature, there exists an important obstacle to anti-competitive 
mergers, demonstrating that competing firms outside the merger often benefit more than the 
buyer and the target firm, since they benefit from an increase in price but need not reduce 
their own output. Hence, sometimes profitable mergers do not occur in equilibrium. 
Lindqvist (2004) proves that for some specifications, this puzzle may be solved if a 
buyer purchases a share of a rival firm before the acquisition, referred to as an outsider-
toehold. The main purposes of this paper have been to demonstrate the existence of these 
outsider-toeholds, test if acquirers benefit from holding outsider-toeholds and estimate gains 
for merging parties with and without outsider-toeholds. Looking at US mergers and 
acquisitions in 1985 to 2000, event studies are used to estimate premiums from stock market 
reactions and regressions to search for possible variables explaining these premiums.  
  24
Two different stages in the acquisition strategy are examined in the event studies; the 
announcement of buying an outsider-toehold and the announcement of an acquisition. The 
results exhibit a positive cumulative average abnormal return, CAAR, for the outsider-
toehold firm in the first stage. More interestingly, CAARs are also significantly positive for 
outsider-toehold firms in the second stage, at the announcement of an acquisition implying a 
positive external gain for a buyer holding an outsider-toehold. Furthermore, this CAAR is 
negatively related to the time between outsider-toehold and acquisition announcements, but 
not affected by the number of competitors and the size of the outsider-toehold. Hence, when 
buyers hold a share of another firm, they mitigate later acquisitions, due to a positive 
externality on the rival firm. In fact, buyers also tend to invest outsider-toeholds in firms with 
a positive and, relative to its rivals, superior CAAR. 
According to these result, buyers extract gains from buying an outsider-toehold before 
making an acquisition. If the choice of holding an outsider-toehold is exogenous, these 
buyers should experience a larger CAAR as compared to buyers not holding outsider-
toeholds. But if the choice of buying an outsider-toehold is endogenous, we may not observe 
differences in CAARs. As an example, buyers may neither gain nor lose from the acquisition 
when holding outsider-toeholds, since this strategy is only used when mergers are difficult. In 
fact, CAARs are not significantly different from zero at the announcement of an acquisition 
for buyers with and without outsider-toeholds. This proposes an endogenous choice of 
whether to buy an outsider-toehold. 
This paper may have interesting policy implications; when rivals gain from a merger, 
this usually implies a decrease in consumer surplus. Firms using outsider-toeholds may thus 
be used as a signal for blocking a merger or an acquisition. In general, however, this paper 
has focused on clean but few observations and further studies on cross ownership are 
necessary to explore the implications of these phenomena.   
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Table A1: Mergers and acquisitions included in sample
a  
  OUTSIDER-TOEHOLD (< 50 %)  ACQUISITION (> 50 %) 
BUYER SELLER  DATE  SELLER DATE 
PETRIE STORES  PAUL HARRIS STORES  9-3-1985  LERNER STORES  5-13-1986 
NA ZONDERVAN  CORP  9-12-1985  NA  5-5-1987 
NA  COMAIR HOLDINGS INC  7-29-1986  NA  8-6-1986 
NA HORIZON  BANCORP  8-22-1986  NA 12-15-1986 
YOUNG (CHAS. P.) CO  PANDICK INC  12-29-1986  SORG INC  2-23-1987 
NA CALNY  INC  2-17-1987  NA  1-14-1991 
NA CENERGY  CORP  3-2-1987  NA  4-6-1989 
NA  BUCKHORN INC DEL  3-2-1987  NA  8-3-1987 
NA  US AIRWAYS GROUP INC  3-4-1987  NA  11-7-1988 
DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS 
ASSC 
UNGERMANN-BASS INC  10-23-1987  DIGITAL TRANSMISSION 
SYSTEMS 
12-30-1988 
NA SKYWEST  INC  1-25-1988  NA  6-8-1988 
NA SABINE  CORP  3-10-1988  NA  8-10-1988 
NA STANDARD 
MICROSYSTEMS CORP 
4-7-1988 NA  6-18-1998 
NA  IMAGINE FILMS ENMT INC  4-7-1988  NA  6-18-1998 
NA HERITAGE 
COMMUNICATIONS INC 
6-13-1988 NA  5-4-1989 
NA  VONS COMPANIES INC  7-18-1988  NA  8-18-1989 
NA  CRYSTAL GAS STORAGE 
INC 
9-19-1988 NA  1-11-1995 
NA SKIPPER'S  INC  1-30-1989  NA  9-30-1992 
NA XILINX  INC  7-27-1989  NA  12-3-1990 
ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES  ECHOCATH INC  -CL A  3-20-1990  NEXGEN INC  10-20-1995 
VITAL SIGNS INC  NORTH AMERICAN 
RECYCLING SYS 





7-25-1991 NA  12-3-1991 
NA  CONVEX COMPUTER CORP  1-7-1992  NA  11-20-1992 
NA COMPLINK  LTD  3-18-1992  NA  6-23-1992 
NA  CHICAGO & NO WESTN 
TRANS CO 
5-5-1992 NA  12-23-1992 
UNION PACIFIC CORP  GENERAL 
COMMUNICATION  -CL A 
12-1-1992  SANTA FE PACIFIC CORP  6-29-1994 
NA  AMERICAN MOBILE SYS  1-8-1993  NA  6-2-1993 
NA  LA QUINTA MOTOR INNS  -
LP 
4-7-1993 NA  6-9-1993 
NA  RODMAN & RENSHAW 
CAPITAL GP 
5-28-1993 NA  7-28-1993 
NA NA  7-16-1993  NA  7-7-1994 
TORCHMARK CORP  KIRSCHNER MEDICAL CORP 1-17-1994  AMERICAN INCOME HOLDING 
INC 
9-15-1994 
NA  PREFERRED ENTMT INC  5-25-1994  NA  8-30-1999 
NA AMERICAN  EXPLORATION 
CO 
5-31-1994 NA  3-28-1995 
NA  HAMPTON RES CORP  8-9-1994  NA  10-6-1994 
NA PLAINS  PETROLEUM 
COMPANY 
9-19-1994 NA  7-1-1999 
NA DATALOGIX 
INTERNATIONAL INC 
9-19-1994 NA  7-1-1999 
NA YOUNKERS  INC  9-20-1994  NA 11-29-1994 
NA NA  9-22-1994  NA 11-30-1994 
NA  SOUTHERN PERU COPPER  10-28-1994  NA  1-3-1996 
AMERICAN GENERAL CORP  COPLEY PROPERTIES INC  12-1-1994  INDEPENDENT INS GRP  10-19-1995 
ASARCO INC  EASTN ENVIRONMENT SVC  4-4-1995  CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS CO  7-15-1999 
NA  AMERICAN INDL PPTYS 
REIT 
4-26-1995 NA  9-7-1995 
NA  DELAWARE OTSEGO CORP  5-24-1995  NA  6-28-1995 
PUBLIC STORAGE INC  COOPER & CHYAN TECH 
INC 
11-22-1995  PUB STRG PPTYS IX  12-14-1995 
CSX CORP  NORTH COAST ENERGY INC 2-13-1996  CONRAIL INC  10-15-1996 
SYNOPSYS INC  NA  5-7-1996  EPIC DESIGN TECHNOLOGY  1-16-1997  
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INC 
NA  PAXSON COMM CORP  -CL A 9-24-1996  NA  -19971-2 
MEDTRONIC INC  U S BIOSCIENCE INC  12-13-1996  PHYSIO-CONTROL INTL CORP  6-29-1998 
NA NA  12-16-1996  NA 12-26-1996 
ALZA CORP  EXCITE INC  2-4-1997  SEQUUS PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 
10-5-1998 
INTEL CORP  NA  3-19-1997  CHIPS & TECHNOLOGIES INC  7-28-1997 
NA NA  6-11-1997  NA  5-18-1998 
INTL SPEEDWAY CORP  -CL A  NA  7-23-1997  PENSKE MOTORSPORTS INC  5-10-1999 
NEWPORT NEWS 
SHIPBUILDING 
NA  3-18-1998  AVONDALE INDUSTRIES INC  1-19-1999 
PEREGRINE SYSTEMS INC  NA  12-17-1999  HARBINGER CORP  4-5-2000 
SYMANTEC CORP  NA  7-24-2000  AXENT TECHNOLOGIES INC  7-27-2000 
JORGENSEN (EARLE M.) CO  -  -  TULL (J.M.) INDUSTRIES INC  3-22-1985 
TOLEDO EDISON CO  -  -  CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUM  6-30-1985 
WEST POINT-PEPPERELL  -  -  CLUETT PEABODY & CO  7-26-1985 
ONYX IMI LTD  -  -  CORVUS SYSTEMS INC  9-25-1985 
PIEDMONT AVIATION INC  -  -  EMPIRE AIRLINES INC  9-25-1985 
LOUISIANA GENERAL 
SERVICES 
-  -  TRANS LOUISIANA GAS CO 
INC 
11-4-1985 
AVERY INC  -  -  UNIROYAL CHEMICAL CP  11-8-1985 
DECOR CORP  -  -  ART EXPLOSION INC  1-15-1986 
STV GROUP INC  -  -  GREINER ENGINEERING INC  5-6-1986 
SPERRY CORP  -  -  TELEX CORP  5-8-1986 
SONIC INDUSTRIES INC  -  -  CHURCH'S FRIED CHICKEN 
INC 
2-5-1987 
MORINO INC  -  -  BGS SYSTEMS INC  2-11-1988 
TRANS WORLD CORP/NV  -  -  DE LAURENTIIS ENTMNT 
GROUP 
10-5-1988 
FINALCO GROUP INC  -  -  CONTINENTAL INFO SYS  -
OLD 
1-11-1989 
BIO-MEDICUS INC  -  -  HEMOTEC INC  2-2-1989 
SPRINGBOARD SOFTWARE INC  -  -  SPINNAKER SOFTWARE CORP  5-3-1989 
COLUMBIAN ENERGY CO  -LP  -  -  MUSTANG COS INC  8-31-1989 
UNITED STATES 
EXPLORATION 
-  -  PRAIRIE PRODUCING CO  12-21-1989 
HADSON ENERGY RESOURCES 
CP 
- -  BARUCH-FOSTER  CORP  3-16-1990 
MICROLOG CORP  -  -  GENESIS HEALTH VENTURES 
INC 
10-15-1990 
GREASE MONKEY HOLDING 
CORP 
-  -  PIT STOP AUTO CENTERS INC  10-24-1990 
HINGHAM INSTN FOR 
SAVINGS 
- -  COHASSETT  SAVINGS 
BANK/MA 
12-21-1990 
PINNACLE WEST CAPITAL  -  -  TUCSON ELECTRIC POWER CO  5-22-1991 
AMERICAN GENERAL 
FINANCE CP 
- -  PROVIDENT  ENERGY  TRUST  8-12-1992 
GULL LABORATORIES INC  -  -  BIO-PLEXUS INC  10-2-1992 
IPALCO ENTERPRISES INC  -  -  PSI RESOURCES INC  12-11-1992 
NUVEEN SELECT MAT MUN FD  -  -  NUVEEN SELECT MATS MUN 
FD 2 
7-28-1993 
SPECTRANETICS CORP  -  -  ADVANCED 
INTERVENTIONAL SYS 
10-7-1993 
INTRENET INC  -  -  PST VANS INC  1-7-1994 
SITE HOLDINGS INC  -  -  METROVISION OF NA  3-30-1994 
NUVEEN SLCT TX FR INCM 
PTL 3 
-  -  NUVEEN SLCT TX FR INCM 
PTL 4 
4-20-1994 
NUVEEN TEX QUAL INCM 
MUN FD 
-  -  NUVEEN TEX PREM INCM 
MUN FD 
6-29-1994 
DAVCO RESTAURANTS INC  -  -  SOUTHERN HOSPITALITY  7-14-1994 
WELLSFORD RES PROP TRUST  -  -  HOLLY RESIDENTIAL PPTYS 
INC 
8-3-1994 
SOFTWARE ETC STORES INC  -  -  BABBAGES INC  8-25-1994 
HF BANCORP INC  -  -  PALM SPRINGS SVGS BK FSB  5-7-1996 
NUVEEN INSD PREM INC FUND 
2 
-  -  NUVEEN INSD PREM INCM 
MUN FD 
7-26-1996 
DSP COMMUNICATIONS INC  -  -  PROXIM INC  10-29-1996 
FCB FINL CORP  -  -  OSB FINL CORP  11-14-1996 
DAKOTA MINING CORP  -  -  USMX INC  1-6-1997  
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STAGE STORES INC  -  -  ANTHONY (C.R.) CO  -OLD  2-19-1997 
ULTIMATE ELECTRONICS INC  -  -  AUDIO KING CORP  3-4-1997 
MONTEREY RESOURCES INC  -  -  MCFARLAND ENERGY INC  6-17-1997 
OMI CORP  -  -  MARINE TRANSPORT LINES 
INC 
6-24-1997 
HMN FINANCIAL INC  -  -  MARSHALLTOWN FINANCIAL 
CP 
7-1-1997 
POST PROPERTIES INC  -  -  COLUMBUS REALTY TRUST  8-4-1997 
ELCOTEL INC  -  -  TECHNOLOGY SVC GROUP 
INC 
8-14-1997 
MARSHALL INDUSTRIES  -  -  STERLING ELECTRONICS  9-19-1997 
PUTNAM MASTER INTERM 
INCOME 
-  -  PUTNAM INTER GVT INCOME  10-9-1997 
DISCOUNT AUTO PARTS INC  -  -  HI-LO AUTOMOTIVE INC  10-14-1997 
TAURUS MUNI CALIF HLDGS  -  -  MUNIYIELD CALIF FD INC  11-26-1997 
AMERICAS INCOME TR INC  -  -  HIGHLANDER INCOME FD INC  4-13-1998 
AVIVA PETE INC  -DEP  -  -  GARNET RESOURCES CORP  4-17-1998 
TROPICAL SPORTSWEAR INTL 
CP 
- -  FARAH  INC  5-4-1998 
INFORMATION ADVNTGE 
SOFTWARE 
-  -  IQ SOFTWARE CORP  6-29-1998 
VERDANT BRANDS INC  -  -  CONSEP INC  7-14-1998 
DIME COMMUNITY 
BANCSHARES 
-  -  FINANCIAL BANCORP INC  7-20-1998 
PITTSBURGH BREWING  -  -  INDEPENDENCE BREWING CO  7-27-1998 
R & B FALCON CORP  -  -  CLIFFS DRILLING CO  8-10-1998 
MESA AIR GROUP INC  -  -  CCAIR INC  8-28-1998 
FIRST FINANCIAL CORP/RI  -  -  MAYFLOWER CO-OPERATIVE 
BK/MA 
10-14-1998 
SUPERIOR TELECOM INC  -  -  ESSEX INTERNATIONAL INC  10-22-1998 
INTEGRATED DEVICE TECH 
INC 
- -  QUALITY  SEMICONDUCTOR 
INC 
11-2-1998 
PROLOGIS  -  -  MERIDIAN INDL TRUST INC  11-17-1998 
ARDENT SOFTWARE INC  -  -  PRISM SOLUTIONS INC  11-19-1998 
SPEEDFAM-IPEC INC  -  -  INTEGRATED PROCESS EQ  11-20-1998 
KALEIDOSCOPE MEDIA 
GROUP INC 
-  -  ODYSSEY PICTURES CORP  1-27-1999 
ESENJAY EXPLORATION INC  -  -  3DX TECHNOLOGIES INC  5-12-1999 
FRIEDE GOLDMAN HALTER 
INC 
-  -  HALTER MARINE GROUP INC  6-2-1999 
PHARMACIA & UPJOHN INC  -  -  SUGEN INC  6-15-1999 





- -  SUNPHARM  CORP  8-16-1999 
DELHAIZE AMERICA INC  -CL 
A 
-  -  HANNAFORD BROTHERS CO  8-18-1999 
INVIVO CORP  -  -  PROTOCOL SYSTEMS INC  12-17-1999 
SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP INC  -  -  ANCHOR FINANCIAL CORP/SC  1-10-2000 
BROADVISION INC  -  -  INTERLEAF INC  1-26-2000 
OPENTV CORP  -  -  SPYGLASS INC  3-27-2000 
WEBMETHODS INC  -  -  ACTIVE SOFTWARE INC  5-22-2000 
GUILFORD PHARMACEUTICAL 
INC 
- -  GLIATECH  INC  5-30-2000 
BROADWING INC  -  -  INTERMEDIA 
COMMUNICATNS INC 
6-8-2000 
TROY FINANCIAL CORP  -  -  CATSKILL FINANCIAL CORP  6-8-2000 
CEPHALON INC  -  -  ANESTA CORP  7-17-2000 
SEACOAST FINL SVCS CORP    -  HOME PORT BANCORP INC  7-24-2000 
LEVITZ FURNITURE INC  -VTG    -  SEAMAN FURNITURE CO  8-10-2000 
a
”NA” is a firm not listed on any stock market and “-“ is an observation without an outsider-toehold. Competitors are not 
specified. 